The Afghanistan Papers – Then and Now, A Comparative Analysis
This blog post is the beginning of a comparative project called Hindsight 2021. I am examining the Afghanistan Papers, published in 2019, alongside current affairs in Afghanistan during 2021.
Hindsight 2021: A Comparative Analysis of Afghanistan
This week, I began reading Craig Whitlock’s newly-released book, The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War. And so, I wanted to use the book as a jumping off point for further research, and to begin my intertextual project, Hindsight 2021. I will be combing through Whitlock’s book, which streamlines the original 2,000 page Afghanistan Papers. My overall approach will be threefold, this project will:
Explore the pattern of blatant deception that was force-fed to the American public for years
Identify recurring themes among the hundreds of interviews, highlighting repeated failures that should be avoided
Go over the past and present history of Afghanistan, hopefully conveying a poignant narrative about the humanitarian damage caused by America’s deception
This general framing is subject to change, though it should be broad enough to act as a strong starting base.
I hope to shape this blog content into a book later on. It would be my first one, and the content could be helpful for my master’s thesis. If I complete this project, as I intend to, I will certainly publish it, though admittedly I will need to learn how. And who knows, maybe I’ll make a blog about that process too.
Nevertheless, by analyzing with this three-pronged strategy, the flaws in U.S. foreign policy will be criticized. But more constructively, alternative policy prescriptions will be given, based on the evidence provided. In short, this project will suggest why and how American foreign policy should be re-calibrated, based on the mistakes made in Afghanistan.
2001 – 2002: “Who is General McNeill?”
Whitlock details the beginning stages of the United States presence in Afghanistan. From 1996 to 2001, the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, until the Bush Administration toppled their government in Kabul in “less than six weeks.” At the start, the U.S. pursued a relentless military campaign, capturing hundreds of al-Qaeda members, and relegating terrorist leaders like Osama bin Laden into fleeing and hiding.
The foundation for Afghanistan, laid out by the Bush Administration, was flawed from its inception. Whitlock describes the disconnect between former Pres. George W. Bush, and his Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Bush gave speeches that “masked worries circulating among the top members of his leadership team.” The disconnect between Rumsfeld and Bush would foreshadow the deception that played out over the next couple of decades, and the Afghanistan Papers would be the result of that dishonesty.
While Bush had been delivering what Whitlock calls “soothing messages” over the course of months, Rumsfeld was worried that the U.S. would get bogged down in Afghanistan, while they lacked an actual exit strategy. Rumsfeld wrote this in one of his memos:
“We are never going to get the U.S. military out of Afghanistan unless we take care to see that there is something going on that will provide the stability that will be necessary for us to leave.”
Implicit in Rumsfeld’s memo, is the assumption that the U.S. military is needed to achieve stability in Afghanistan. This creates a narrow set of alternatives that only allow for increased U.S. military engagement, overlooking the possibility that the military is contributing to instability in Afghanistan. In short, this foreign policy model subtly rejects the idea that America’s involvement could be inherently defective.
On September 18, 2001, legislation that was spurred on by 9/11 was rushed through Congress. The Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) was put into effect, after a near-unanimous Congressional vote. The bill allowed for “all necessary and appropriate force” to be used against those who were involved with perpetrating the 9/11 attacks.
A pattern of unclear objectives becomes clear during this chapter. One official was interviewed, saying: “What were we actually doing in that country? We went in after 9/11 to defeat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, but the mission became blurred.” The official goes on to criticize the lack of clarity on what the U.S. mission is trying to accomplish. Is it “Nation building? Women’s rights?”
Given the murky circumstances, the Pentagon’s initial orders lacked specifics. And on Oct. 16, new orders were given by Bush’s National Security Council (NSC), calling for al-Qaeda and Taliban rule to be ended. This also conflicted with the Bush Administration trying to limit boots on the ground engagement, since Afghanistan apparently had a history of trapping invaders.
Priorities also started to shift. While al-Qaeda started out as the target, eventually the Taliban found a bullseye painted on their back, as did their affiliates. Former NSC staffer, Jeffrey Eggers, criticized this, saying: “Why did we make the Taliban the enemy when we were attacked by Al Qaeda? Why did we want to defeat the Taliban?”
Eggers touches on the important role of motives, or lack thereof. People did not even know who the enemy was. The lack of incentive, coupled with an ambiguous enemy, made for a disastrous concoction.
Douglas Lute, White House war czar for Afghanistan, had an interview that echoed the incompetence experienced by Eggers. Lute argued that the military was unequipped to develop strategy because it relied on outsiders who were not educated enough on policy. And what limited policy experience they did have was not enough to compensate for the lack of their military strategy experience. Among other things, Lute also criticized budgets being poorly handled, failed infrastructure projects, and limited time horizons. Lute argues for a “Goldwater-Nichols II” style of restructuring the U.S. military command structure, referencing the 1986 act that changed the structure of the Department of Defense (DOD).
“We didn’t know what we were doing,” says Lute, citing a lacking understanding of Afghanistan. More importantly, “a lack of understanding of the resources necessary.”
Richard Boucher, a retired U.S. diplomat, draws attention to an ever-present theme: America setting impractical goals. This stems from the lack of knowledge that Lute and Eggers spend time lambasting. Boucher says the United States had set an “impossible” goal: to create a stable, American-style government in Afghanistan with “democratic elections, a functioning Supreme Court, an anti-corruption authority, a women’s ministry and thousands of newly constructed public schools with a modernized curriculum.”
American invincibility played a factor in bin Laden’s miscalculated 9/11 attacks, who never expected the U.S. to go to war in response. In fact, bin Laden was partially trying to destroy the myth of American invincibility, after he was inspired by al-Qaeda’s Oct. 12, 2000 USS Cole attack, which killed 17 U.S. Navy personnel. But instead of staving off America’s occupation and oppression, Bin Laden’s 9/11 attacks only made matters worse, fueling the war on terror campaign that would be waged for decades to come.
America’s sense of invincibility has contributed to absurd foreign policy outcomes in Afghanistan. This likely played a role in the logistical ineptitude experienced by Eggers, Lute, and Boucher. Eggers asserts that the U.S. and its military undertake actions beyond their capabilities, e.g. nation-building. Similar to the fantastical “American-style” approach mentioned by Boucher, Eggers worked with Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, who proposed a “government-in-a-box” program. McChrystal claimed his plan was to install public services after the U.S. overthrew the Taliban stronghold, Marjah.
However, Marjah faced insurmountable obstacles to achieving these goals. “Eight of 81 certified teachers are on the job, and 350 of an estimated 10,000 students are going to school.” Meanwhile, the Taliban was threatening to kill residents who cooperated with Americans.
False hopes about returning home were also spreading in 2002. Intelligence officer, Maj. Lance Baker, said there were rumors spreading in his unit, primarily because there was nothing going on: “There’s no more fighting, Afghanistan’s done. We’re going home.”
However, there was an ideological shift, which was used to justify a longer occupation. Stephen Hadley, “the White House’s deputy national security adviser at the time,” describes this shift. Hadley says the focus became introducing “freedom and democracy to Afghanistan as an alternative to terrorism. To make that happen, U.S. troops needed to prolong their stay.” And in keeping with the theme of unrealistic goals and no strategy, Bush continued to offer no specifics on his approach. In a speech he gave at the Virginia Military Institute, Bush said: “We’ll stay until the mission is done.” Though now, with the Afghanistan Papers interviews being released, it is clear that America’s mission was floundering and riddled with errors.
Many involved in Afghanistan have shared sentiments about America setting unrealistic goals, specifically when it comes to establishing a democracy. But the U.S. began turning their attention towards Iraq, putting the Afghanistan democracy agenda on the backburner. And on Oct. 21, 2002, Rumsfeld and Bush had a very telling exchange, where Bush did not recognize the name, General McNeill, while Rumsfeld attempted to schedule a meeting:
Bush: Who is General McNeill?
Rumsfeld:
He is the general in charge of Afghanistan.
Bush: Well, I don’t need to meet with him.
2021: Comparative Analysis
The AUMF has contributed to America’s lingering presence in Afghanistan. Biden signaled that he wanted to repeal and replace the law earlier this year, as it had been used too broadly to justify “open-ended combat against Islamic militant groups scattered across the world.” Biden had an uphill battle, since this was a law Congress had struggled to find any agreement on for years.
A partisan divide began cropping up around the AUMF in early August this year. Politico reported about a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing on Aug. 3, 2021, where Democrats and Republicans faced some divergence on the issue. Democrats expressed concerns about repealing the AUMF in an effort to mend relations with Iraq, while Republicans worried “about what taking the law off the books would mean for Iran.”
Texas Senator Ted Cruz (above), argued that repealing the AUMF would “be used as justification for continuing to go soft on Iran.”
Thankfully, in a 14-8 vote, the panel voted on a bill to repeal the 2002 AUMF for the Iraq War, and the 1991 AUMF for the Gulf War. This shows a promising step towards reform, and it may not have been possible had it not been for Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan. And whether it was Bush, Obama, Trump, or Biden conducting the withdrawal, an extremist backlash was inevitable.
Biden is not absolved of all criticism though, and he has faced bipartisan backlash for his withdrawal. And though Biden has accepted some degree of blame, he still defends his policy direction.
On Aug. 19, just two days after Kabul was overthrown by the Taliban, the Biden Administration froze billions in reserves for the Afghan people. This has spurred on the Taliban to claim they will be establishing a new, accountable government, most likely so they can regain access to their frozen funds. Taliban spokesman, Zabihullah Mujahid, says they have been holding meetings with officials as a way of seeking advice to build an accountable government. The terrorist group claims they will be releasing a new government plan for Afghanistan. However, given their tendency to suppress speech and abduct their opposition, it is highly unlikely that accountability is truly on the table.
An Aug. 23, 2021 New Yorker article details how there have been several reports by the U.N. and U.S. intelligence, warning about al-Qaeda having a resurgence. According to the U.N., al-Qaeda “was active in fifteen of Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces, primarily in the eastern and southern regions,” as of June, 2021. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) warned that the U.S. withdrawal leaves uncertainty about “whether even the modest gains of the last two decades will prove sustainable.”
Some argue that Biden’s recent withdrawal from Afghanistan caused its fall to the Taliban. Baked into this, is the notion that staying in Afghanistan beyond Biden’s Aug. 31 withdrawal date was necessary. And, by pulling out, Biden was only making the situation worse in Afghanistan, allowing the Taliban to take over. However, the reality has proven to be more complicated, as the Afghanistan Papers depict a tale of unclear objectives, American arrogance, and incompetent leadership. For instance, during his interview, Eggers tells how the U.S. military transported their fuel by helicopters, a patently inefficient practice!
On Aug. 25, 2021, the Taliban started brokering political ties to maintain their stranglehold over Afghanistan. The Taliban has been meeting with former Afghan officials, and there are two primary motives for them holding these meetings: to keep aid coming into the country and to restore the billions of dollars in international reserves.
One anonymous Taliban official reported to Reuters that atrocities and crimes are already being committed against civilians. And according to Afghans, international aid and advocacy groups, protests have been suppressed. Further, anti-Taliban opposition is being rounded up, and those associated with the former Afghan government are being targeted. These actions are characteristic of prior Taliban action. As discussed in a previous post, the Taliban has detained residents in unidentified locations in places like southern Kandahar. This occurred recently during late July, as the Taliban captured and accused hostages of associating with the former Afghanistan government.
Casting further doubt on Mujahid’s claims of accountability, is one anonymous official, who corroborates that the Taliban is still fearful of international pressure. Though the Biden Administration is justified in freezing financial reserves, Afghan people have become reliant on U.S. aid. So freezing funds will devastate many Afghan civilians, preventing them from withdrawing money from their bank accounts.
Ajmal Ahmady, Afghanistan’s former Central Bank Governor, asserts that “the nation’s economy faces severe strains as foreign capital and aid are choked off.”
There are also fears of internal resistance in the region. On Aug. 23, the Taliban fought back against a small resistance movement in the northern Panjshir Valley, an anti-Taliban stronghold.
Led by Ahmad Massoud, the anti-Taliban group, National Resistance Front of Afghanistan, have been bracing themselves for conflict. Massoud has been preparing for peace talks with the Taliban, but the potential for violence still looms overhead following Kabul’s collapse.
Massoud argues for an inclusive, broad-based government in Kabul, which is clearly at odds with the incipient totalitarian regime. On Aug. 18, Massoud wrote a Washington Post op-ed, explaining how him and mujahideen fighters have been accumulating arms and ammunition for 20 years now, anticipating a Taliban takeover. And now, Massoud has been vindicated in his preparation. But in terms of executing a strategy, the Taliban has the clear advantage.
Massoud acknowledges this, saying their military and resources are still not sufficient, unless they’re supplied without delay by their “friends in the west.” But Pres. Biden has been clear about moving forward with his Afghanistan withdrawal, so even if the U.S. were to help, it would either be limited or insufficient. Massoud claims that, once left to their own devices in Afghanistan, the Taliban will begin churning out anti-democratic plots, appealing to global security concerns.
In his op-ed, Massoud writes a final plea to the United States:
“America and its democratic allies do not just have the fight against terrorism in common with Afghans. We now have a long history made up of shared ideals and struggles. There is still much that you can do to aid the cause of freedom. You are our only remaining hope.”
It seems doubtful that the Panjshir Resistance can fend off the Taliban. Without enough U.S. aid, their success is limited. And even defining what “success” is under their circumstances is riddled with uncertainty and bleak outcomes. The true best outcome would be for America and other countries to accept as many Afghan refugees as reasonably possible. Doing this, while providing enough public aid to refugees, would ease the transition. Sadly, offering even one of these would be met with a wave of backlash from the American right wing, who for decades have eroded public aid programs, while fear-mongering about refugees. This is reflected in their rhetoric today:
“What if we just cut off the unemployment? Hunger is a pretty powerful thing,” said Laura Ingraham earlier this month.
“First we invade and then we’re invaded,” said Tucker Carlson, during the same month, about Afghan Refugees.
Massoud claims that many people from other provinces are seeking refuge in Panjshir, which would provide some much-needed manpower for their efforts. But with an encroaching Taliban acquiring large swaths of territory, coupled with the U.S. withdrawal, resistance is not a viable option.